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INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2004 the European Commission approved the sale of Syngenta Bt-11 sweet corn.
1 It has been the first Genetically Modified product (hereinafter 'GM product') to be placed in the European market since 1998. Before that year more than ten GM products had been granted market access in accordance with the European Communities (hereinafter 'EC') approval procedure.
In the past few years political tension arose between the leading Genetically Modified Organism (hereinafter 'GMOs') producers, such as the United States of America (hereinafter 'US'), Canada, Argentina, Egypt and Australia, 2 and the EC, 3 because the latter would have put in place a deliberate suspension of its own GMO approval process, which negatively affected their exports to the European market. On the one hand, it was argued that no new application was permitted and, on the other hand, that the pending ones were deliberately not granted. In other words, according to the GMO producer states, the EC has established a general moratoria for new GM products and a product specific moratoria for those GM products, whose application was still pending. Furthermore, several EC member states also established national import bans on GM products.
This tension has finally led the GMO issue directly into the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter 'DSB') agenda. In fact, in In 2001 the US, Argentina, Canada and China accounted for ninety-nine percent of the total land area devoted to biotech products. 3 In the same year the EC only accounted for less than four-tenths of one percent of the worldwide land area devoted to biotech products. dispute. 5 The DSB, pursuant to the request of the three countries, established a single panel on August 29, 2003. 6 However, due to disagreement among the parties in the dispute on its composition, it was finally constituted only in March 2004. 7 The parties have already sent their first submissions to the Panel, which has also already held oral hearings. The panel's decision was due in September 2004 but it has been postponed to March 2005 because, in August 2004, the Panel announced that it would seek expert advice on technical and scientific issues raised in the dispute. 8 Against this factual background, the goal of this paper is to analyse the possible influence of the GMO dispute and of the legal issues therein on the ongoing trade and environment debate within the WTO.
The first part of this paper will describe the EC GMO regulation and it will underline its legislative changes in the last fifteen years. The second part will introduce the current GMO dispute before the WTO and it will analyse the parties' submissions before the Panel. In the following part of the paper we will underline the main legal issue at stake, which is the role of the precautionary principle in the EC GMO regulation. We will see how the WTO has dealt with this principle in its previous case law and we will study how the parties in the GMO dispute address this issue in their submissions before the Panel . Finally, we will draw our conclusions on the possible influence that the GMO dispute may have on the trade and environment debate. Argentina, 8 August 2003. 6 In accordance with Art. 9 of the DSU. The EC has been dealing with the use and the placing on the market of GM products since the mid 1980's. 9 The GMO legislation has developed and it has been modified in order to follow scientific novelties and public opinion concerns. Very recently it has suffered a new important modification, which is important to underline because the dispute before the WTO concerns only the old EC GMO regulation. The
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS REGULATION
Complainants specifically maintain that they are arguing against the application of the old legislation and do not want the Panel to take into account recent developments in the EC and its recent application. Furthermore, the EC GMO regulation has been modified very recently and the previous legislation has been amended by two regulations: Regulation (EC) Nº 9 See Communication de la Commission au Conseil "Un Cadre Communautaire pour la Reglamentation de la Biotechnologie", COM(1986) 0573. 10 This position is reaffirmed in European Communities -Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (WT/DS291), Executive Summary of the First Submission of the United States --04/30/2004 States --04/30/ (2004 , available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispu te_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file737_5542.pdf, § 16. Therefore, the fact that two GMOs have been placed on the European market in the last months does not change the Complainants position. 
Characteristics of the European Communities GMO Legislation
We will analyse the EC GMO legislation in order to underline its main characteristics and we will specify which elements are due to the novel regulation. In the first place, the objective of the legislation is to protect human health and the environment from possible adverse effects arising from GMOs. 16 These objectives must be fulfilled "in accordance with the precautionary principle", 17 which is the cornerstone of the EC legislation.
The scope of the regulation is the placing on the market of GM products. The latter, in order to receive a market approval must not "present a danger for the consumer", must not "mislead the consumer" and must not "differ from the foods that they are intended to replace to such an extent" for them to be "nutritionally disadvantageous for the consumer". 18 If the three criteria are met, the GM product will be granted a market approval. The authorisation procedure in Directive 2001/18/EC is provided for in Art. 13 through 15. The new EC GMO legislation provides for a very similar procedure. In fact, according to Reg. (EC) 1829/2003, a GMO will be placed on the market only after an authorisation, which can be obtained from the applicant from the competent authority of a Member State (Art. 5.1). The application must demonstrate that the GMO meets the three criteria set out in Art. 4.1. In order to make a decision the Competent Authority can ask a Member States Food Assessment Body for a food safety assessment and it can ask a competent authority to carry out an environmental risk assessment (Art. 6.3). the three criteria above-mentioned. 21 It must also provide a dossier with the results of the environmental risk assessment that the applicant is obliged to carry out.
Furthermore, the applicant must present a labelling proposal for the GM product once it is placed on the market. 22 Further assessment regarding GM product market approval may be requested to the applicant from the Competent Authority that is dealing with the application or from any other Member State concerned with the placing on the market of the GM product. 23 Directive 2001/18/EC provides for a very similar procedure.
However, it specifies that in case a market approval is requested for a specific kind of GM product, it may have to meet new and more stringent criteria in order to better protect human health and the environment.
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If the Competent Authority decides in favour of a market approval, the applicant can place the GM product on the market and his product shall circulate freely in all EC Member States. 25 The decision that authorises the placing on the market of the GM product will also establish the labelling requirements that the product must comply with.
It must have a label that specifies that the product is or contains a "genetically modified organism". 26 However, Directive 2001/18/EC maintains that labelling will not be mandatory for those products that have only traces of authorised GMOs, under certain thresholds. 27 The new GMO legislation has provided that labelling will not be necessary for food containing less than 0,9% GMOs of the total ingredients. 28 The market approval authorisation will be granted for a maximum of ten years. In conclusion, the EC GMO regulation refers to the placing on the market of GM products. The entire legislation is based on the precautionary principle and on an authorisation procedure, which follows an environmental and health risk assessment.
Once a GM product is placed on the market its must be labelled and it must be traceable at all times.
THE GMO DISPUTE BEFORE THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Once clarified the EC GMO legislation, this part of the paper will analyse the dispute between the EC and the Complainants before the WTO. analyse the preliminary issues that have been raised by the parties. Thirdly, we will deal with the supposed violations of the SPS Agreement. Finally, we will underline possible breaches of other WTO Agreements.
Challenged Measures before the Panel
In the request for the establishment of the Panel the Claimants identify three EC measures that negatively affected their exports of GM products to the European market.
The first measure is the so called general moratoria, which has been defined as "the suspension by the EC of consideration of applications for, or granting of, approval of biotech products". 35 The second measure is the product specific moratoria, which is the 
Nature of the challenged measures
The parties disagree on this point and it can be argued that the dispute's final decision will depend on how the Panel decides this very first preliminary issue.
On the one hand, the Complainants consider that, despite the fact that the EC general moratoria and the product specific moratoria are not present in any official document, they have the same effects as if they were embodied in legal documents.
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On the other hand, the EC clearly argues that all assertions about a deliberate moratoria are to be intended as 'delays' in the authorisation procedure for the placing on the market of GM products. 41 The EC strongly maintains that there is no general or product specific moratoria. with as issues of 'delays' in the authorisation procedure for the placing on the market of GM products.
47
The EC position leads to two first conclusions. Firstly, no charge can be presented against its general moratoria because such moratoria does not exist. Secondly, the charges against its allegedly product specific moratoria must focus on 'delay' issues.
On the opposite, the EC does not contest the challengeable nature of the national GMO bans from several Member States.
Applicable Law
The parties disagree in their interpretation on which WTO Agreements is applicable to the EC measures. On the one hand, among the Complainants, the US strongly maintains that the objective of the EC measures is the protection of human health and that, therefore, the applicable law must be found in the Agreement on The EC argues that in order to determine the applicable law the objective of its GMO legislation and of the different WTO Agreements must be analysed together. It maintains that the main objective of its GMO related legislation is to protect the environment. 49 While the SPS does not deal with environmental concerns, the TBT and the GATT do have environmental related provisions. Therefore, the EC concludes that the SPS Agreement is applicable only to the extent that the challenged measures are relative to the protection of human health, while, when the main interest is environmental protection, the applicable law must be found in the other two WTO Agreements.
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Furthermore, the EC stresses the importance of the Cartagena Protocol in this dispute. It argues that the WTO must not be read in clinical isolation from International 47 This is important to underline because it refers to the application of a provision and not to its establishment.
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First written submission of the United States § 71-80. However, it reserved the right to make claims also under the TBT Agreement. Law. 51 On the contrary, the multilateral trading system must take into account international law rules ad principles. The Cartagena Protocol is currently the most advanced and 'specific' international legal text in the field of trade in GMOs. The EC, together with leading experts, 52 considers that the Cartagena Protocol can assess the WTO in the interpretation of specific issues, such as the application of the precautionary principle or of the environmental risk assessment. 53 In other words, it maintains that, because the Cartagena Protocol has a more 'specific' scope than the WTO, provisions present in WTO agreements may be clarified through reference to provisions therein. 
Violation of the SPS Agreement
The Complainants consider that the EC general moratoria, the product specific moratoria and the national bans breach several SPS provisions. These violations can be divided into two groups: violations of procedural requirements (Art. 8 and Annex B, Art. 7 and Annex C) and violations of substantive obligations (Art. 5.1 and Art. 2.2).
These violations entail a disguised restriction on international trade in accordance with Art. 5.5 and Art. 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 
Violation of Procedural Requirements
According to the Complainants position, the EC measures constitute a violation of specific procedural requirements provided for in the SPS Agreement. On the one hand, the measures do not comply with the obligation to undertake approval procedures without undue delay (Art. 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement) and, on the other hand, they do not comply with the obligation to promptly publish sanitary measures (Art. 7 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement).
Approval procedures must be undertaken without undue delay
The first procedural requirement that presumably has been violated is provided for in Art. 8 of the SPS Agreement, 56 which must be read together with Annex C, paragraph 1 (a). 57 The two provisions maintain that parties are allowed to establish marketing approval systems based on an authorisation process, such as the EC procedure for the placing on the market of GM products. However, the SPS Agreement requires such procedures to be "undertaken and completed without undue delay".
58
Undue delay is considered by the Complainants to be "the "unjustifiable" and excessive" [ ] "hindrance" in undertaking or completing an approval procedure". 59 The EC moratoria falls into this definition and, therefore, the EC measures violate SPS obligations provided for in Art. 8 and Annex C.
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SPS Agreement, Art. 8: "Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of control, inspection and approval procedures, including national systems for approving the use of additives or for establishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure that their procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
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Ibid, Annex C.1 (a): "Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that such procedures are undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported products than for like domestic products." (Emphasis added).
58
Emphasis added.
59
First written submission of the United States § 89. For the reasoning behind the product specific moratoria see ibidem § 137-139.
The EC, as we have mentioned above, maintains in the first place that the general moratoria does not exist and that, therefore, it cannot be challenged under any WTO provision. In the second place, it argues that the product specific moratoria is not a deliberated ban on GMO imports. It is only an issue of 'undue delay'. Therefore, it agrees with the Claimants that this EC measure can be challenged under such procedural requirement. However, it denies that the authorisation procedures violates Annex C.1 (a) of the SPS Agreement. The delay in the authorisation process would be caused by the request for further information, which is an essential element of the GMO legislation. 
Sanitary Measures must be published promptly
The second procedural requirement that has been violated according to the Complainants position is provided for in Art. 7 of the SPS Agreement, 61 which must be read together with Annex B, paragraph 1. 62 The two provisions maintain that sanitary measures must be published promptly.
The Complainants argue, as we have seen above, that the EC moratoria is a measure, notwithstanding the fact that it is not present in any official document. Ibid, Annex C.1 (b): "Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that (…) the standard processing period of each procedure is published or that the anticipated processing period is communicated to the applicant upon request; when receiving an application, the competent body promptly examines the completeness of the documentation and informs the applicant in a precise and complete manner of all deficiencies; the competent body transmits as soon as possible the results of the procedure in a precise and complete manner to the applicant so that corrective action may be taken if necessary; even when the application has deficiencies, the competent body proceeds as far as practicable with the procedure if the applicant so requests; and that upon request, the applicant is informed of the stage of the procedure, with any delay being explained;" Emphasis added. 63 See supra pp. 8-9. members to become acquainted with it. Not having fulfilled this requirement, the EC has violated Art. 7 of the SPS Agreement.
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The EC defence is once again based on the fact that the general moratoria does not exist as such and that the authorisation procedure has followed correctly the EC legislation and has not violated Annex C.1(b) of the SPS Agreement. 
Violation of substantive obligations
The Complainants argue that the EC measures do not comply with substantive obligations present in the SPS Agreement. They consider that they do not comply with the obligation to carry out a risk assessment (Art. 5.1) and with the obligation to base measures on scientific principles (Art. 2.2.).
Sanitary measures must be based on a risk assessment
The first substantive obligation that has been presumably violated by the EC measures is provided for in Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement that obliges sanitary measures to be based on a risk assessment.
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According to the Complainants position the EC has established the moratoria without a previous risk assessment. While the Appellate Body has argued in earlier decisions that in order for a sanitary measure to be established there must be a "rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment", 67 in this case there would be no relationship whatsoever because no risk assessment has been undertaken. Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 1998, § 193. 68 First written submission of the United States § 100-108. For the reasoning behind the product specific moratoria see ibidem § 143-149.
The EC defence is based, firstly, on the fact that the general moratoria does not exist as such. Secondly, the EC argues that its GMO legislation includes risk assessments as one of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to grant a market approval and that this has been done in all challenged GMO applications. 69 Finally, the EC considers that the national bans and the product specific moratoria are not to be dealt with under the SPS Agreement. However, if they were to be challenged therein they are justified under Art. 5.7. 70 In fact, they constitute a temporary provision based on the precautionary principle. Furthermore, the EC argues that they were established because science was not sufficient; that they were based on the available pertinent information; that the Member States are seeking for more information; and that the measures will be reviewed. 
Sanitary measures must be based on scientific principles
The second substantive obligation that has been supposedly violated by the EC measures is provided for in Art. 
Disguised Restriction on International Trade
The Complainants argue that the EC measures are a disguised restriction on international trade because, on the one hand, they violated Art. 5.5 that obliges members to be consistent in the application of sanitary measures, and, on the other hand, because the EC measures also violated Art. 2.3 that obliges members to not discriminate in the application of sanitary measures. The Complainants argue that in order to determine whether a measure violates Art. 5.5 three conditions must be met. 75 First, different sanitary measures must be established for similar situations. The EC was doing exactly so by distinguishing between products elaborated with GMOs, such as certain types of cheeses, whose placing on the market does not have to be authorised, and new GM products that must be previously authorised. Second, these differences must not be arbitrary or unjustifiable. The Complainants consider that both kinds of GM products could suppose health or environmental problems and that there is no solid reason for their discrimination. Third, the measures will be a disguised restriction of international trade if the two first conditions are met and if they were not based on a risk assessment. As we have already seen above, the Complainants maintain that the measures were not based on a risk assessment. Therefore, the three conditions are met and the EC measures factor', which is the extremely more important effect of the GMO moratoria on the US, Canada and Argentina producers than on the Europeans…
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The EC replies only to the challenge to its national bans and to the products specific moratoria. It considers that they do not violate Art. 5.5 because they fall under the exception provided for in Art. 5.7. However, the argues that GM products are different from non GM products and that to establish a regulatory difference between the two products is neither arbitrary nor unjustified. 
Sanitary measures must not be discriminatory
The last SPS Agreement provision that has been violated by the EC measures, according to the Complainants position, is Art. 2.3., 79 according to which sanitary measures must not discriminate between members where similar conditions prevail.
Previous WTO jurisprudence has maintained that if a measure violates Art. 5.5, the measure will also be deemed discriminatory and, therefore, in violation of Art. 2.3.
80
Following this reasoning the Complainants consider that the EC measures also violate this last SPS provision.
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Ibid § 126: "Finally, the "additional factor" is a disproportionate effect of the general moratorium on producers outside the European Communities as compared to producers within the European Communities. In 2001, the European Communities accounted for less than four-tenths of one percent of the worldwide land area devoted to growing biotech products. In contrast, the United States, Argentina, Canada, and China accounted for ninety-nine percent of the total land area devoted to biotech products in 2001. For producers in these countries, the moratorium on approvals of biotech products has had a substantial negative effect. The disproportionate impact of the general moratorium on internal versus imported products is an "additional factor" as it is a strong indication that the measure is discriminatory or a disguised restriction on international trade." The EC argues in the same way but with opposite conclusions. Taking into account that the national bans and the product specific moratoria do not violate Art.
5.5., they will also not violate Art. 2.3.
Violation of Other WTO Agreements
While the US only presented claims of SPS violations in its first submission to the Panel, Canada and Argentina also raised issues related to other WTO Agreements.
Both countries consider that the EC challenged measures are inconsistent with the TBT Agreement and with the GATT. Furthermore, Argentina considers that the moratoria is violating EC WTO obligations to developing countries arising from the special and differential treatment clause, which is present in the SPS and in the TBT Agreement.
Finally, the EC argues that, even if the Panel should decide in favour of the Claimants' position, all measures would be justified under Art. XX of the GATT.
Violation of the TBT Agreement
Canada and Argentina claim that the EC measures have also breached the TBT Agreement. Even in this case the EC raises a preliminary issue that will be fundamental for the dispute. The TBT Agreement only applies to technical regulations and the EC does not consider the challenged measures to be so. According to the European position, these measures do not lay down clear requirements and cannot be considered abstract technical regulations.
82 Therefore, the EC does not reply to the alleged violations of the TBT Agreement.
However, it is interesting to see which provisions were violated, according to the position of Canada and Argentina. Firstly, the two countries consider that the EC TBT Agreement, Art. 2.1.: "Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country." 84 Ibid, Art. 2.2.: "Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate establish technical regulations for the protection of human health or the environment but these must not create "unnecessary obstacles to international trade". Canada and Argentina maintain that the EC measures objective is neither human health nor environmental protection and that their application is unnecessarily trade restrictive. can not give to an imported product a different treatment than the one accorded to a domestic like product.
Canada, Argentina and the EC agree on the three conditions that must be met in order for there to be a violation of Art. III. 4 of the GATT. First, imported and domestic products must be 'like products'; second, the challenged measure must be a law; and third, imported products must be accorded a less favourable treatment than like domestic products.
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The first condition is to determine a GM like product. 88 Argentina and Canada consider that GM like products are the domestically grown non biotech counterparts.
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On the other hand, the EC argues that the only possible like product is a domestic GM product. 90 The second condition is to assess whether the challenged measures is a law or a regulation. Despite the fact that the moratorias are not present in any official GATT, Art. III.4.: "The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. (…)" Emphasis added. document, Argentina and Canada consider that they should be considered as if they were laws. On the other hand, the EC maintains that only the national bans are laws in accordance with the Art. III.4 GATT requirement, while the alleged moratorias must be considered as issues related to possible delays in the application of a legitimate procedure. 91 The third condition that must be met is to see whether imported and domestic like products are treated unequally. The Complainants argue that the domestically grown non biotech counterparts do not have to be authorised in order to be placed on the market and, therefore, they consider that the EC measures finally violate Art. III. 4 of the GATT. On the other hand, the EC reaches the opposite conclusion because it says that the domestic GMO are placed on the European market in accordance with the same authorisation process that regulates imported GMOs. 
Violation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions
Argentina claims that the EC moratoria has negatively affected exports to the EC from developing countries that have adopted GMOs techniques in their agriculture. This violates, according to Argentina's position, Art. 10.1 of the SPS Agreement and Art.
12.3 of the TBT Agreement that embody the principle of the special and differential treatment principle.
The US does not specify which WTO provisions have been violated by the EC measures in relation to developing country exports, but it does underline strongly their negative impact. It considers that countries whose population is starving have denied US aid consisting in GM food for fear that their meat exports to the EC would have been hindered. 93 The US in its submission suggests that "agronomic and nutritional issues of particular concern to developing countries" can be solved through "biotech research activities". 94 Thereby, the US seems to be blaming the EC of hindering global solutions to food shortage. However, the Amicus Curiae Submission, § 15 remind us that the US "is unique among industrialised countries in refusing to donate financial aid as food aid and insisting on the provision of US grain generated as agricultural surpluses. Aid is therefore used in an effort to support US corporations and interests…"
The EC maintains that Argentina's allegations only ground is that the moratoria is illegal and that, therefore, it also violates Art. 10.1 of the SPS Agreement. It also contests Argentina's position in relation to Art. 12.3 of the same Agreement, according to which the EC measures would violate this provision because they also violate Art.
5.2.1 of the TBT. Furthermore, the EC replies to Argentina's claim also on factual grounds maintaining that statistics demonstrate that developing country exports have not reduced since they have been using GMOs. 
Concluding Remarks on the GMO Dispute before the WTO
In conclusion, the Complainants consider that the three challenged EC measures, the general moratoria, the product specific moratoria and the national bans, violate provisions of the SPS Agreement, of the TBT Agreement and of the GATT.
Furthermore, Argentina argues that the special and differential treatment principle has 96
First written submission by the European Communities… § 671. According to the Amicus Curiae Submission, § 15: "Roundup Ready soybeans grown in Argentina can be imported in the EC, but are restricted by lack of market demand,…" 97 GATT, Art. XX (b): "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (…) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." 98 GATT, Art. XX (d): "(…)necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices." 99 GATT, Art. XX (g): "(…) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." also been violated by the EC measures. On the other hand, the EC denies that the general moratoria exists as such and it considers that both the general and the product specific moratoria must be dealt with by the Panel as possible cases of undue delay in the application of the authorisation procedure for the placing on the market of GMOs.
Therefore, the EC focuses on the national bans and on the pending applications (the product specific moratoria). It maintains that both do not breach any WTO Agreement. 
THE ROLE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE GMO DISPUTE
This part of the paper pursues two goals: first, it wants to show the importance of the precautionary principle in the GMO dispute before the WTO. Second, it wants to analyse how it has been dealt with in previous WTO disputes and how it has been conceived by the parties in the current dispute.
This part is divided into four sections. The first one will deal with the precautionary principle within the EC GMO legislation. The second section will underline its presence in a global context. The third one will analyse how the precautionary principle has been dealt with in previous WTO case law and the last section will finally study its role in the GMO dispute, according to the position of the parties therein. 101 It first appears in the preamble, which not only lays down the principles that govern the piece of legislation; it also should be used in order to interpret any provision of the Directive. Paragraph 8 of the preamble reads as follows:
The Precautionary Principle in the EC GMO Policy
"The precautionary principle has been taken into account in the drafting of this Directive and must be taken into account when implementing it."
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The Directive clearly maintains that the precautionary principle guided the drafters of the EC GMO legislation. Furthermore, the preamble underlines that the principle is not only a theoretical reference. On the contrary, it must be taken into account at all phases of the Directive's implementation. 103 In other words, the application of Directive 2001/18/EC must be based on the precautionary principle.
The latter is also present in the normative part of the Directive. Human health and environmental protection are the EC GMO legislation objectives and they must be "Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle, ensure that all appropriate measures are taken in order to avoid adverse effects on human health and the environment which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs. GMOs may only be deliberately released or placed on the market in conformity with part B or part C respectively." 107 The latter must be used in the implementation of the community legislation on GMOs. In other words, once again, the application of Directive 2001/18/EC must be based on the precautionary principle.
The Relevance of the GMO Dispute Scope
This conclusion is very important for the GMO dispute before the WTO. We Having underlined the importance of the precautionary principle in the GMO dispute before the WTO, this section will analyse how this principle has evolved in the international community.
The Precautionary Principle as an International Environmental Law Principle
Even if the origins of the precautionary principle were related to human health Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993 , 31 ILM (1992 , at 818., Preamble: "Noting also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat," Emphasis present in the original text.
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994 , 31 ILM (1992 , at 849, Art. 3.3.: "The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost." account the precautionary principle 113 and trade in GMOs can be denied in accordance with it.
114
In conclusion, the precautionary principle is now present in many multilateral environmental agreements and it is a pillar of the international community's most advanced legal framework on biotechnology.
Precautionary Principle as a Sustainable Development Law Principle?
In the last few years some of the international environmental principles have evolved. Some are not only related to the protection of the environment but they have also other characteristics and pursue similar but different objectives. This evolution must be analysed together with the effort to better define sustainable development. Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity… op. cit., Art. 1: "In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements." The importance to determine whether the precautionary principle is a norm of international law is without doubt. A conclusion in one or in the other direction has relevant practical consequences for the relationship with the WTO and it is extremely important for the GMO dispute.
The Precautionary Principle in the WTO Jurisprudence
In this section we will analyse how the WTO has dealt with the precautionary principle and we will underline its position on the legal nature of the principle.
The multilateral trading system takes into account sustainable development interests. In fact, the preamble of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter 'the Marrakech Agreement') underlines that sustainable development is one of the objectives of the organisation. 118 As we have mentioned above, precautionary principle can be considered a constitutive part of sustainable development; therefore, it can be argued that the WTO also recognises the importance of this principle. The link between the WTO and the precautionary principle is clear from the analysis of one of the WTO Agreements. In fact, the SPS Agreement, even if it does not use the term 'precautionary principle', clearly provides for it.
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The WTO DSB has dealt with the precautionary principle in two cases: the Hormones case in 1998 120 and the Asbestos case in 2001. 121 Both cases dealt with human health issues, but they also provide useful information for disputes in which human health is accompanied by environmental protection, as in the current GMO dispute before the WTO.
The Hormones Case
Agora on International Environmental Law with a presentation titled "Unravelling the Trade and Environment Debate through Sustainable Development Law Principles".
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Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994), preamble, § 1: "Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development," Emphasis added.
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See supra note 71. The first dispute in which the precautionary principle was mentioned was decided in 1998 and it dealt with EC measures that prohibited imports from the USA and Canada of meat treated with hormones for growth purposes. These measures were considered to be not compatible with Art. 3 of the SPS Agreement. 122 The latter allows higher sanitary protection than what provided for in international standards but these measures must be justified by scientific evidence 123 and by a risk assessment.
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According to the Panel and to the Appellate Body, the EC measures were in breach of the SPS Agreement because they did not provide for a risk assessment that justified such measures.
The precautionary principle was a central element of this dispute. One of the legal issues at stake was to determine whether "the precautionary principle was relevant in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement". 125 In order to reach a conclusion on this point the parties and the WTO addressed the legal nature of the precautionary principle.
On the one hand, according to the EC the principle was already a norm of International Law. The EC position was as follows:
"The precautionary principle is already, in the view of the European Communities, a general customary rule of international law or at least a general principle of law, the essence of which is that it applies not only in the management of a risk, but also in the assessment thereof."
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The EC stressed that the principle is present not only in the management but also in the assessment of a risk. In other words, the EC considered that the precautionary principle referred to the implementation of a measure. Therefore, in the Hormones case the EC approach was similar to the current one in the GMO dispute, in which the principle must also be present in the application of the EC measures.
On the other hand, the US had a completely opposite view about the precautionary principle. According to its position, it is not a principle but just an approach:
"The United States does not consider that the "precautionary principle" represents a principle of customary international law; rather, it may be characterized as an "approach" --the content of which may vary from context to context." How did the WTO approach the legal nature of the precautionary principle? We could answer that it did not. However, a refusal to answer a question or to deal with an issue can also provide information. The Appellate Body maintained the following in its decision:
"(…) The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general principle of customary international environmental law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law appears less than clear. We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, question. We note that the Panel itself did not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of the precautionary principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least Second, the WTO judges considered that the determination of whether the precautionary principle is a general principle of international law or not was an abstract question. We disagree with the Appellate Body reasoning on this point. In fact, if the legal issue at stake, as we have seen, was to determine if "the precautionary principle was relevant in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement"; 130 the legal nature of a principle, which can be applied to a WTO Agreement, is not an abstract question. On the contrary, a decision in one or in the other direction has a very important practical implication for the WTO dispute. In the Hormones case the Appellate Body finally decided that the precautionary principle, as such, could not overrule specific SPS provisions.
In conclusion, this WTO dispute presented three different approaches to the legal nature of the precautionary principle: the EC considered it to be already a principle of International Law; Canada maintained that it might become a principle of International Law; and the US argued that it was only an approach. The WTO did not want to deal with this particular issue but the final decision showed that its position was closer to the US' one and that it considered the debate on the legal nature of the precautionary principle to not have any relevant practical consequences.
The Asbestos Case
The second WTO dispute in which the precautionary principle plays an law. Even if the challenged measure was not based specifically on the precautionary principle, the spirit behind the French ban was clearly inspired by it. This decision reinforced the view that the WTO Agreements support members' ability to protect human health and safety at the level of protection they deem appropriate. This could be valid not only for sanitary measures but also for measures whose objective is the protection of the environment as well.
The decision in the Asbestos case can be seen as a step forward in the recognition of the precautionary principle on behalf of the WTO.
The Precautionary Principle in the GMO Dispute before the WTO
Once clarified the importance of the precautionary principle in the EC GMO legislation; the evolution of the principle within the international community; and its consideration in the multilateral trading system; in this section of the paper we will analyse how the parties in the GMO dispute before the WTO have dealt with the precautionary principle.
Is the Precautionary Principle an International Law Principle?
The parties in the GMO dispute before the WTO, except Argentina, are the same ones than in the Hormones case. Not only are the countries the same but also their position on the legal nature of the precautionary principle has not changed. Furthermore, the US argues that this case presents similar aspects to the Hormones dispute and that the Panel should follow the case law therein and not deal with the legal nature of the precautionary principle. 131 However, the US in its rebuttal submission to the EC first submission maintains that:
"(…) it strongly disagrees that "precaution" has become a rule of international law. In particular, the "precautionary principle" cannot be considered a general principle or norm of international law because it does not have a single, agreed formulation. (… On the other hand, the EC disagrees completely with the Complainants position and it considers the precautionary principle to be a principle of International Law. 134 Furthermore, it considers that this principle is the cornerstone of the Cartagena Protocol, which is the final result of the international community's GMO trade regulation efforts.
Do International Law Principles Inform WTO Agreements?
As in the Hormones case, the parties view on the legal nature of the precautionary principle is very distant. The US underlines, just as it did in the previous dispute, that it considers the definition of the precautionary principle status a "theoretical" issue. 135 As discussed above we strongly disagree with this position. January 27, 1980 , printed in 25 ILM (1986 , at 543; Art. 31.3: "There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the rule of international law because the US is not a party thereof. However, even if it were a party, the US argues that the Protocol would still not be applicable to the dispute because, according to its position, it would not "change the rights and obligations under any existing international agreements."
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In sum, the Complainants agree that the WTO can be interpreted through public international law rules but that these must be present in treaties in which both are parties. If one is not, then a rule present in the international treaty, in this case the Cartagena Protocol, cannot be used in order to interpret WTO Agreements. In other words, according to the Complainants position, the precautionary principle as provided for in the Cartagena Protocol, cannot be used in order to interpret WTO provisions, which may be relevant for the decision of the GMO dispute.
On the other hand, the EC reaches a completely opposite conclusion. Firstly, it argues that the WTO does not live in clinical isolation from International Law. 140 Secondly, it maintains the following:
"There can be no doubt that the WTO agreements (…) must be interpreted and applied by reference to relevant norms of international law arising outside the WTO context, as reflected in international agreements and declarations."
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The EC stresses that not only can the WTO be interpreted through International Law norms; but that provisions of the multilateral trading system can also be applied by reference to such norms. This would mean that the application of a WTO provision can be based on a norm outside of the multilateral trading system. The EC continues its reasoning maintaining that: "(…) the Protocol's provisions on precaution and risk assessment inform the meaning and effect of the relevant provisions in the WTO agreements." Rebuttal Position --07/29/2004… op. cit., § 18 . The US is referring to the next to last introductory sentence of the Cartagena Protocol Preamble. However, this must be read together with the one before it and the one after it. The three introductory sentences read as follows: "Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development, Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements, Understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international agreements,"
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See supra note 51. This entails, according to the EC position, that the Cartagena Protocol provisions, which refer to the precautionary principle, can guide WTO members in the interpretation and in the application of the precautionary measures provided for in the SPS Agreement.
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In other words, the EC maintains that public international law norms can be used in order to interpret and to apply WTO provisions. The precautionary principle present in the Cartagena Protocol is a rule of international law. Hence, the SPS Agreement provisions, which refer to the precautionary principle, can be interpreted and applied in accordance with the Cartagena Protocol's related provisions.
CONCLUSIONS: WILL THE GMO DISPUTE BE A STEP FORWARD OR A STEP BACK IN THE WTO RECOGNITION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE?
The goal of this paper is not to anticipate possible Panel's findings in the GMO dispute. In the paper we have studied the GMO dispute before the WTO and we have underlined the most important legal issue at stake, which is the role of the precautionary principle in the application of the EC measures.
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The analysis of the scope of the dispute demonstrates the importance of the precautionary principle. If the EC position prevails, the scope of the GMO dispute will deal with delays in the application of the challenged measures. These delays are due to the request for further information, 145 which is required because the EC considers that it does not have enough information to correctly assess the possible adverse risks to 143 This is also the position of the Amicus Curiae Submission, § 98: "We respectfully submit that the precautionary principle is an international standard and is relevant to the Panel's analysis of those provisions in the WTO Agreements concerning risk, including SPS Articles 2 and 5, TBT Articles 2.2 and 2.2 and GATT articles II and XX." The Panel will have to decide on several issues that have been raised by the parties in their submissions and that have been underlined in this paper. The following list summarises the possible work of the Panel. It will have to determine whether the EC measures (the general moratoria, the products specific moratoria and the national bans): 1. are WTO challengeable measures; 2. authorisation process for the placing on the market of GMOs has been too slow and, therefore, if they have violated the obligation to take a decision without undue delay in accordance with Art. 8 and Annex C.1 (a) of the SPS Agreement; 3. can be challenged under the SPS Agreement; 4. have been guided by a previous environmental risk assessment and, therefore, do not violate Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement; 5. are justified under Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement; 6. are technical regulations and, therefore, if they are challengeable under the TBT Agreement; 7. violate the national treatment principle present in Art. III.4 of the GATT. For that purpose the Panel will have to decide on what is a GMO like product; and 8. are justified under Art. XX of the GATT. 145 The Complainants consider that the Panel must decide on the WTO consistency of the three EC challenged measures, despite the fact that they are not present in any official EC document. On the other hand, the EC argues that the dispute is about the application of the authorisation procedure for the placing on the market of GMOs and that the Panel should decide whether there have been cases of undue delays in its implementation.
human health and to the environment arising from the placing on the market of GMOs.
The request for further information is a measure taken in accordance with the precautionary principle.
146 Therefore, the scope of the GMO dispute clearly shows the relevance of the precautionary principle in the controversy. The first conclusion of this paper is, therefore, that the scope of the GMO dispute is to determine whether the EC measures, whose application is based on the precautionary principle, are justified under Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.
The second conclusion of this paper refers to the role that the GMO dispute can play in the ongoing trade and environment debate.
On the one hand, in order to reach a conclusion on the consistency of the We have mentioned above that the crucial issue is whether there have been undue delays in the implementation of the EC measure. How does the EC defend itself on this point? It argues that delays in the authorisation process are due to the request for further information. This kind of request is a central element of the procedure because it allows the EC to have a clearer view of the possible adverse risks to human health and to the environment arising from the placing on the market of GMOs. The request for further information in the application of the EC measure is decided in order to better pursue the two objectives of the EC GMO legislation: protection of human health and protection of the environment. These objectives, and all measures taken in order to pursue such goals, must be fulfilled in accordance with the precautionary principle. Therefore, the request for further information is a measure taken by the EC to fulfil the Directive's goal and it is based on the precautionary principle. This entails that the Panel will have to decide on the consistency of a measure, whose application is based on the precautionary principle, with WTO law. but they do not agree that the Cartagena Protocol can play such a role in the GMO dispute because they are not parties therein.
On the other hand, the WTO Appellate Body case law on the precautionary principle has evolved. In the Hormones case it did not consider that International Law rules could overrule the SPS Agreement provisions and it maintained that general acceptance of the precautionary principle as a norm of International Law was less than clear. On the contrary, in the Asbestos case the Appellate Body changed direction and decided in favour of a measure inspired by the precautionary principle.
Therefore, the second conclusion of this paper is that, depending on how the Panel will undertake the study of the EC challenged measures in respect to Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, the WTO recognition of the precautionary principle can make a step forward or a step back.
If the Panel decides to take into account provisions regarding the precautionary principle from outside the WTO in order to interpret the SPS Agreement, this will mean that the multilateral trading system is opening itself to other fields of international law that can inform the WTO when disputes deal with issues which are not only trade related, but that may also deal with human health, environmental or, for example, labour related concerns. This would be very important for the ongoing trade and environment debate. On the other hand, if the Panel does not take into account international law norms in order to interpret the SPS Agreement, it would entail a negative signal. The WTO would isolate itself from the rest of International Law and public opinion criticism would probably increase.
In conclusion, the GMO dispute will demonstrate if the WTO is ready to take a step forward in the recognition of the precautionary principle, and of environmental and social concerns in general. 147 Emphasis added.
